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The definition of pornography and avoiding normative 
silliness: a commentary adjunct to Rea’s definition* 
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Newcastle University  
 
Many definitions of pornography implicitly involve begging the question concerning its 
moral value.  One exception to this is Rea’s 2001 definition.  The present paper 
identifies some counter-intuitive consequences of this definition of pornography and 
seeks to amend it.  The aim of the paper is to separate a definitional understanding of 
pornography from a normative understanding of pornography in order to lay the 
foundations for future, coherent moral thinking on the subject. 
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1. The best definition out there 
 
Michael Rea (2001) offers a two-part definition of pornography which is by far the 
best attempt to define which objects belong to the set that can be termed 
pornography and to which greater set such objects belong.  It is by far the best 
definition of pornography because it avoids much “normative silliness” that is 
present in other, rival and prior definitions of pornography.  However, the definition 
is still inadequate and so the present paper will show where Rea's definition fails 
(section 3) and offer a new conjectural definition of pornography open to public 
scrutiny and awaiting correction and reply (section 4).  Of course, prior to these 
discussions, it is pertinent to say a couple of things about why a definition of 
pornography is required and why most definitions can be accused of “normative 
silliness” as well as briefly looking at the justification of Rea’s definition in terms of 
his intuitions and arguments (section 2). 
 
2. Why we need a definition 
 
Pornography occupies both a legal and moral place in the public sphere.  Legally, 
it is subject to censure and to discussions of whether or not it should be prohibited 
or distributed and to whom.  Morally, it is subject to debate over whether or not it is 
a worthwhile use of time and, more significantly, whether participating in the 
making or consumption of pornography constitutes wrongdoing.  Knowing what is 
actually being discussed would, then, seem to be quite important. 
Although there is extensive academic literature on the subject, much of the 
philosophical work devoted to the discussion of pornography and pornographic 
objects makes a quite basic error.  It confuses normative judgement with denotative 
meaning.  “Murder” is “unlawful killing” and to ask whether or not murder is wrong 
is an empty question.  The definition is a normative one (whether legal or moral 
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meanings of unlawful are intended) and the question “but is murder wrong?” is, to 
use Moore’s rather useful technique, a closed question.  Yet, to ask whether “killing” 
is wrong is an open question.  Murder is a subset of instances of killing and there is a 
need to separate the description of an event or object from an evaluative 
judgement.  Killing is, to be disingenuously straightforward, the termination of life 
and to ask whether the actual fact of the termination of life is wrong is to do moral 
philosophy because cases such as euthanasia, war and abortion challenge our moral 
understanding.  All these problematic cases testify to the separation between a 
description (“killing”) and its normative counterpart (“murder”). 
Moral theory requires descriptions to identify a set of cases to which subsets will 
be identified as good or right, bad or wrong, or morally neutral.  So, killing is a set of 
events (the taking of a life) which is divided into normative sets (lawful, unlawful, 
accidental) under the rationality of a major premise derived from a moral theory 
(unlawful killing is killing that is a violation of the autonomy of the agent; or unlawful 
killing is killing that results in a decrease in overall welfare of all significant subjects 
affected, to be overly simplistic).  Moral theory comes into play after the definition 
of the major set of objects has been identified.  The definitions of pornography do 
not do this as a general rule and this leads to begging the question or, at the other 
extreme, emptiness of moral judgement. It is this type of philosophising that is best 
caricatured as "normative silliness" and the inherent silliness will hopefully be made 
clear below. 
Pornography is variably defined as the production of sexual representation for the 
purpose of exchange (Huer 1987); artistic material with little, if any, aesthetic value 
(Berger 1977); the representation of persons as mere sexual objects (McElroy 1997); 
and the representation of institutional inequality between the sexes (Dworkin 1981; 
Langton 2009; Mackinnon 1993). None of these are remotely adequate and, more 
importantly, are to a large extent examples of begging the question in the most 
unphilosophical of ways.  Rea's argument proceeds in terms of a simple method of 
reflective equilibrium: offer a definition identifying some necessary property of 
pornography and then offer an object which does not fit the definition that a 
consensus would, however, agree is pornography; or offer an object which fits the 
definition that, however, a consensus would agree is not pornography.  So, for 
example, the definition of pornography as “sexually explicit bad art” is problematic 
because one may want to argue that The Story of O(Réage 1972) is actually well 
written and structured but a consensus would still agree that it is pornographic.   
Alternatively, the racier passages of Jackie Collins are sexually explicit and arguably 
badly written, but a consensus would still deny that her novels were pornographic.  If 
the definition is descriptive, then it is tested in one of two ways: first, it must not 
identify a set that excludes any objects we would intuitively understand to be an 
example of pornography; and, second, it must not identify a set that includes any 
objects we would intuitively understand not to be pornography.  The claim of the 
present argument is that Rea's own definition fails by this very requirement, but that 
will be discussed later.  It is firstly pertinent to illustrate the storehouse of intuitions 
Rea believes will provide a consensus. (2001: 120-122) His examples (with certain 
embellishments) are summarised below divided into those we ('the consensus') 
consider to be pornography and those that we do not: 
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Pornography Non-pornography 
1. Photographic images in Playboy, 
Penthouse, et cetera; 
2. Films such as Deep Throat and 
Debbie does Dallas; 
3. Peep show performances and 
sexually explicit adult theatre shows; 
4. Marilyn Monroe naked in Hustler 
magazine circa 1940; 
5. Literature such as Story of O or a 
collection of the letters from a 
Penthouse type magazine; 
6. “The profit machine”; 
7. “Shoe fetishist island”; 
8. The Bible; 
9. Photographs of naked bodies in 
National Geographic magazine; 
10. Artworks such as Michelangelo's 
David and Goya's La Maja Desnuda; 
11. Marilyn Monroe naked in Life 
magazine circa 1996; 
12. A lingerie catalogue; 
13. Images identical to 1 (in left-hand 
column), but appearing in a plastic 
surgeon's portfolio or a medical book; 
14. Images identical to 1 used as 
evidence in a trial; 
15. Intimate images, films, performances 
(strip shows) made by a partner for their 
partner and kept private. 
 
Rea uses two hypothetical examples (numbers 6 and 7) that require further 
elucidation. The profit machine describes an investor who sets up a computer to 
produce a commodity for a specific market place that will be a success.  The 
computer produces and distributes a magazine much like Playboy.  The investor 
knows nothing about what has been produced but happily takes the money.  What 
he produces, Rea sensibly assumes, is pornographic material.  The profit machine 
describes the production of pornographic material without the intention of 
producing material that has the effect of sexual arousal (the investor knows nothing 
nor cares about what his product is).  The idea is that a director may earnestly make 
a film with aesthetic intentions, but it is received as pornography despite his own 
sincere intentions.  The shoe fetishist island example describes a community in which 
for some reason the images of shoes are sexually arousing for most members.  A 
normal shoe catalogue is then sold to the island and is bought for the purpose of 
aiding sexual gratification and protest groups demand its prohibition because of 
supposed harm to the community.  The shoe catalogue illustrates that what we take 
to be pornographic may not be in other cultures and some objects we would see as 
non-pornographic would be in other cultures.  Both examples also puts pay to 
Naverson’s (1993) definition of pornography as material produced with the aim of 
aiding sexual gratification since, in both cases, the intention of the producer is 
superfluous to the reception of the object. 
Rea economically and convincingly dispenses with the 'standard' definitions of 
pornography (2001: 123-134).  An overtly idle summary of his arguments is 
expressed in the following bullet points. “Pornography is...: 
a) … sexually explicit material.”  The definition cannot be necessary since the 
Bible is sexually explicit. 
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b) … sexually explicit material produced for the sake of profit.” (Huer 1987) 
Imagine an amateur short film involving sexually explicit acts uploaded to 
youporn.com by a consenting couple.  The film is not produced for profit but 
does satisfy some exhibitionist urge.  It is still, though, surely pornography. 
c) … bad art.” (Berger 1977) An overtly aesthetic approach to the question that 
is obviously keen to protect Goya and Michelangelo from charges of 
obscenity (number 10).  One feels the real worry is obscenity and we shall 
discuss that below, but some pornographic objects may well exhibit 
characteristics typical of good art: the Marquis de Sade (1990), Bataille (1977) 
and Réage (1972) are obvious contenders.  In fact, there is often a latent 
poetry in much pornographic discourse. The simple phrase “a pearl necklace” 
does actually embody several layers of poetic craft: the very good visual 
description of what the metaphor represents coupled with the ironic idea of 
a conventional gift for a certain type of woman. Pornography can satisfy 
many of the requirements of good art. 
d) ... the portrayal of subjects as mere sex-objects.” (McElroy 1997) Whatever 
this may mean, it is simply not true. Characters in pornography films are not 
mere objects more than any other type of film: they are business women, 
housewives, babysitters, teachers, exotic dancers, timid, exhibitionist, sly, 
innocent and so on. The characterisations are often not of the level of an 
Oscar winning film, but the basics are at least present. Moreover, number 12 
represents women as mere clothes horses: their bodies are used merely to 
show the curves and stitching on the underwear. At least page 3 in The Sun 
attempts to tell us about the likes, hobbies and political views (usually right-
wing!) of Sharon, aged 20, from Essex. 
e) … obscenity.” (RCOFC 1979)  There are obvious instances of obscenity that 
are not pornographic, especially when considering it as a form of offence: 
passing wind and swearing jump to mind.  Of course, pornography is sexually 
explicit offensive material, but there exists sexually explicit material that is 
not obscene (numbers 8 and 13, for example).  If, however, one were to ask 
why these are not obscene, the answer will be something along the lines of 
“it is not pornography.”  Obscenity or offence without a pre-understanding of 
a distinction between pornographic and non-pornographic objects will do no 
work whatsoever as it remains painfully circular. 
The tenor of these discussions is, though, a red herring because the above 
descriptions are not normatively neutral. They are all guilty of the normative silliness 
that was alluded to above and one can make this silliness stark through a 
consideration of the most influential of the definitions of pornography: pornography 
is material that oppresses certain individuals or a specific group. (Dworkin 1981; 
Langton 2009; Mackinnon 1993)  The Bible oppresses certain groups if it is read in a 
certain way, but no doubt the claim is that there is a specific use of predominantly 
sexual discourse to produce oppression.  One way to comprehend the claim is to 
consider Irish jokes: since the Irish are always represented as foolish in English jokes 
(much as the Carabinieri are in Italian jokes), then it has an influence on the agent's 
understanding of an individual who happens to belong to that group. One is more 
likely, due to unconscious associations brought about by these jokes in early 
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character development, to prefer an English lawyer to an Irish one.  And such an 
association (as is clearly the case here) may well be ideology which requires 
reflection and refusal since it is due to historically conditional circumstances (such as 
the social exclusion of Catholics in British society). It could plausibly be argued that 
the representation of women in pornography reinforces and reproduces institutional 
inequality in that, when seeking advice, one is more likely to prefer a male lawyer to 
a female one.  The existence of pornography obstructs the possibilities and 
opportunities of all women.  
Whatever the truth of the empirical claim, the problem with such a definition is 
that it is conceptually useless in moral discourse.  If pornography is to be defined as 
sexually explicit material that is oppressive of individuals or groups, then it is an 
empty definition.  If one objects and points to sexually explicit material that is not 
oppressive, say Lucía y el sexo (2001), then they will be told that it is not 
pornography.  But, then one is forced into agreeing that all pornography is bad and is 
conceptually so.  So, the definition of pornography is overtly normative from the 
start and, what is more, it begs the question: if something is pornography then it is 
necessarily bad and if it is not bad then it is not pornography. And that is problematic 
because one might want to point to attempts to deconstruct the oppressive 
hierarchies by using pornography itself (as Baisse-moi (2000) intends to do even if 
not wholly successful) in the same way as an Irish comic may well use Irish jokes and 
our expectations of them to invert the ideology at their heart.  Sexually explicit 
material could be premised on equality or attempt to challenge the institutional 
inequality at the heart of the discourse and industry.   
The issue that arises here is why not define pornography descriptively (say as 
sexually explicit material) and then add that of the set of pornographic objects, some 
are oppressive, some are harmless and some are progressive.  Take once more the 
comparison with Irish jokes.  The repetition of jokes about the Irish should be 
discouraged and subject to sanction in line with race laws in extreme cases since the 
necessary foundation of such jokes is the association of the Irish with foolishness.  
However, it is still possible to tell a joke that is not racist nor sexist (or not so to a 
relevantly offensive degree). There are jokes and some of them are immoral. Their 
immorality rests in the reproduction of ideologically dubious conventions.   
Similarly, there are representations of sex and some of it is pornography and some 
of that is immoral. One needs to separate the description from the evaluation 
otherwise one is guilty of begging the question or making a normatively empty 
judgement.  It is akin to defining killing as the illegitimate taking of a life and refusing 
to countenance the existence of any killing that is not illegitimate, much as a Jain 
may hold.  The gap between a descriptive definition and a normative judgement 
defines the grey areas of moral discussion which are evaluatively interesting. 
And that means we still require a denotative meaning of the word pornography 
which is normatively neutral.  Rea's definition is normatively neutral in that it 
identifies a set of objects which are pornographic.  Furthermore, it is more consistent 
than rival definitions with a storehouse of intuitions about objects one ordinarily 
terms pornographic or non-pornographic.  However, it is overly complex and 
inadequate. Or, at least, the following section will attempt to show this. 
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3. Why the definition is inadequate 
 
So, here is Rea’s (2001: 120) definition in full: 
 
Part 1:  x Is used (or treated) as pornography by a person S = DF (i) X is a token 
of some sort of communicative material (picture, paragraph, phone 
call, performance, etc.), (ii) S desires to be sexually aroused or 
gratified by the communicative content of x, (iii) if S believes that the 
communicative content of x is intended to foster intimacy between S 
and the subject(s) of x, that belief is not among S’s reasons for 
attending to x’s content, and (iv) if S’s desire to be sexually aroused or 
gratified by the communicative content of x were no longer among S’s 
reasons for attending to that content, S would have at most a weak 
desire to attend to x’s content. 
 
Part 2: x is pornography = DF it is reasonable to believe that x will be used (or 
treated) as pornography by most of the audience for which it was 
produced. 
The argument against Rea's definition proceeds by firstly offering an object which 
is intuitively not pornographic yet fits part one of his definition.  The argument then 
concentrates on part two of the definition and demonstrates that Rea assumes that 
communicative material is aimed towards an ideal or primary audience.  This 
assumption will be shown to be false and that it creates a problem with certain 
intuitions that Rea takes for granted in his original examples. 
One might be tempted to hold that there are objects which a consensus would 
agree are not pornographic but, according to Rea's definition, are seemingly so.  For 
example, the music video for 50 Cent’s song P.I.M.P. (2005) has a high degree of 
sexual content, even though there is no nudity nor actual sexual activity.  If that case 
is controversial, one might want to cite the video of Beyoncé and Shakira's Beautiful 
Liar (2007). The video is obviously not pornography nor at all sexually explicit, yet 
one can imagine a fourteen year old male who wishes to use the content of these 
videos to gratify himself, but he was in fact a heavy metal fan who actively dislikes 
the music in itself.  In this case, the pop video meets all of the conditions of part one 
of Rea's definition: the video is a token of communicative material by which the boy 
wishes to achieve sexual gratification and he does not believe (unfortunately, he 
sighs!) that the video will foster any intimacy between him and Beyoncé or Shakira 
and, lastly, he would personally not attend to the video if he did not wish to achieve 
gratification as he actively dislikes the music.   
Rea would, of course, cite the second part of his definition: “it is reasonable to 
believe that x will be used as pornography by most of the audience for which it was 
produced.” (2001: 120)  The music video is not pornography because the fourteen 
year old is exceptional as most agents would attend to the video to enjoy the visual 
interpretation of the music and it is not “reasonable” to assume that most of the 
audience are going to use the video for sexual gratification. 
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Just as the fourteen year old is exceptional, so too are those agents who use 
extreme images of fetishism that would not normally be expected to satisfy or 
gratify: images of sexual violence, or women dressed as nursing maids and 
breastfeeding full grown adults.  Such communicative material would not appeal 
(one assumes!) to a majority of agents wishing to be sexually aroused, but the issue 
is not one of majority and minority preferences as these are still pornographic 
images.  Part two of the definition states that “by most of the audience for which it 
was produced” and it could be argued that these images, unlike the music videos, 
are produced in order to gratify a specific audience and that there is no audience 
beyond that.  So, music videos are not pornography because they have an audience 
of which a subset attend to them for different reasons whereas fetishism videos are 
only attended to by those who wish to seek sexual gratification. 
The producer of the music video is well aware that he is marketing a song and, 
given this intention, he is producing the video with the intention of selling it.  There 
are parts of the audience who will consume it because it is a visual interpretation of 
the music, those who will consume it as an embodiment of lifestyle and those who 
will consume it for purposes of arousal.  Each of these form a separate “audience” as 
it were and the producer wishes to appeal to as many “audiences” as possible in 
order to maximise sales.  The producer has “mixed motivations” in producing the 
video and to each of these “motivations” corresponds “an audience.”  It is not 
impossible to concur that a music video has been produced to be sold to a specific 
audience who will use it as pornography (according to part one of Rea's definition) 
over and above those who will attend to it for its normal or supposed use. 
And if one admits that music videos overtly use sexual imagery to sell their 
product and their production is based on this expectation, at least in part, then 
music videos meet part two of the definition.  And that means Rea’s definition 
identifies a set which includes an object (music videos) that a consensus would not 
agree are pornography.  Rea's mistake is to assume that objects of the sort he is 
discussing have an homogeneous and ideal audience when they can have various 
uses for different possible consumers. 
So, music videos could be considered pornography by Rea's definition. He has two 
responses: to bite the bullet and say yes they are (and he would not be alone) but he 
loses his claim to consensual plausibility.  Alternatively he could say that music 
videos, unlike pornography and the fetishist examples above, possess qualities that 
can create a strong desire to attend to them even if the agent does not want to use 
them for sexual gratification.  Even though the teenager above does not attend to 
them for these reasons, musical videos are objects which possess qualities which 
most of the intended audience would identify as creating such desires. And these 
qualities define an “ideal” or “primary” audience that give substance to the 
“reasonable” nature of our attentions.  Just as statements created in the language 
English are primarily aimed at an English-speaking audience, the communicative 
content of music videos is primarily aimed at music lovers. 
Yet, if Rea does say something of the sort, then it creates problems for his other 
examples.  The Story of O is rightly described as an example of pornography.  A 
doctoral student reading gender studies, however, may attend to the book both as a 
literary document and for purposes of sexual gratification.  When the student has 
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finished being gratified and returns to the book, she still has an interest (or strong 
desire) in attending to the object as the subject of her doctoral thesis.  If one agrees 
that the book has some literary merit, then it is not pornography because the 
intended audience understand it as a literary work even if it is also used as 
pornography.  Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that The Story of O would be 
primarily attended to as a literary work rather than as pornography.  In this respect , 
the book differs from the anthology of Penthouse letters which Rea believes are of 
the same class (number 5).  And so it seems to exclude music videos from the set his 
definition identifies, Rea must also exclude an object that a consensus would 
normally take to be pornography, viz. The Story of O.   
Rea’s obvious reply is to invoke the distinctions between tokens of a specific type.  
The type-token distinction allows him to assert that the images of Marilyn Monroe 
are both pornography and not pornography because of the variables “1940/Hustler” 
and “1996/Life”. The actual instantiation of the type as a token determines its ideal 
or primary audience.  So, the music video is both pornography and not pornography 
because of the variables “musically interested” and “hormonally charged” and 
similarly so The Story of O which is pornography in one’s own bedroom, but not 
pornography in the university lecture theatre.  These assertions need to be 
considered in more detail. 
Rea affirms that photos of naked people can be non-pornographic in contexts such 
as National Geographic magazine or in art, even if used by teenagers for sexual 
gratification, which is intuitively agreeable. However, in the same paragraph, we are 
told that "something might also depict pornography without itself being 
pornography." (2001: 121) Amongst such things, we are told that pornography used 
as evidence in a trial (number 14) and sexually explicit photographs of a spouse on a 
mobile phone (number 15).  More puzzlingly still, he states: “if by some strange 
accident a sexual encounter between two people happened to be broadcast live to 
the nation or to be photographed and published on the internet...”, it would not be 
pornography. (2001: 121) The examples here seem to be instances of pornographic 
material that are excluded by Rea's definition and one feels his intuitions are 
misplaced. 
The assumed agreement or consensus with Rea’s intuitions on these cases is not 
credible.  If my friend has sexually explicit images on his phone of his spouse and he 
tells me so, I would describe these as pornographic images and he, too, might well 
describe them in this way to others.  Similarly, the jurors at the trial would say, on 
returning home, that they had been made to look at pornographic material.  Less 
controversially, stolen sexually explicit home videos made available on the internet 
against the sincere wishes of the participants are, when watched three thousand 
miles away on a PC screen, pornography.  Such claims, contrary to Rea’s assertions, 
are intuitively plausible. 
Take firstly the evidence in a trial. It is evidence in a trial, but it does not cease to 
be pornography even if it is not being used in such a manner by the jurors and 
barristers.  One guesses that it is probably evidence and of significance because it is 
pornography. If a knife is used as evidence in a murder trial, it does not stop being a 
knife, it is just being put into a different context and can be put into that context 
because of what it is.  Again, the object has a different use dependent on the context, 
THE DEFINITION OF PORNOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
but Rea uses the type/token distinction in order to propose that the type can be 
different at different times and places.  Yet, there is a metaphysical mistake about the 
nature of objects here which shall be discussed below.  
The further example is perhaps more telling: intimate images, films, performances 
(strip shows) made by a partner for his or her partner and kept private (number 15).  
This group contains two very distinct types of objects. A wife doing a strip show for 
her husband is no more pornographic than the two of them having private sex.  But 
once that show is filmed, even if kept for private use on his phone, it would be 
described as “having pornographic images on his phone.”  Even if he had them 
behind security passwords and firewalls because the original strip show now exists as 
a possible object of public viewing.   
Clause (iii) of part one of the definition rightly excludes acts of personal intimacy 
from the set of pornographic objects.  Yet, the images may not be pornographic for 
the spouse, but only in the same way as a painting is not art for the philistine 
investment banker who buys a Van Gogh painting for its expected accruement in 
value but can see no beauty or worth (other than monetary value) in the object.  The 
husband and the investor have a particular attitude to an object which obstructs 
them from having a proper public attitude to the object.  It is the reverse, if you will, 
of the fourteen year old's special interest in certain music videos.   
Two further examples bear out these intuitions.  First the husband of a 
pornography model will nearly always stand in a particular relationship to pictures of 
his wife, but they do not cease to be pornographic for the rest of the audience.  
Second, private homemade films that originally fitted category 15 but have been 
stolen and distributed around the internet against the sincere wishes of the 
participants are pornography.  How, though, can the contingent fact of whether a 
film has been stolen or not transform it from non-pornography into pornography?  If 
the husband's wife strips for him, it is not, nor ever could be pornography, yet the 
images on his phone are pornography from the moment they are taken. 
The filming of the wife's strip or naked photographs of the husband make the 
object into a possible public object of exchange.  You cannot exchange the act of sex 
between private consenting agents (no matter what the performance entails) but 
once filmed or photographed or related in a diary, then there exist two objects: one, 
the event intimate to the participants and, two, the public object.  No doubt this is 
true of all actors and their films and models and their images. One can imagine Burt 
Lancaster watching From Here to Eternity (1953) and remembering just how cold that 
sea was or how the water entered his nose as the waves crashed on him.  But those 
are his memories not ours.  We see a man consumed with passion and oblivious to 
the crashing, metaphoric waves.  It is the plural nature of communicative content 
whether it be due to the mixed motivations of its creation or relative contents of its 
consumption that is not exhausted by the simple type-token distinction (although 
that is necessarily part of it).  And it is the nature of such objects that demands to be 
amended in the definition under discussion. 
 
4. How to amend Rea’s definition 
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As has been made pertinently clear, the definition Rea offers is by far the best 
definition of pornography out there, but remains problematic.  First, the definition is 
in terms of what is reasonably to be used as pornography and is in two parts.  A two-
part definition is nothing more than inefficient rather than seriously flawed, but it is 
"odd that what is pornography" is to be defined in terms of "what it is to be used as 
pornography" as Rea himself admits. (2001: 35) His reasons for doing so are clear: 
the picture of Marilyn Monroe circa 1940 in Hustler would have been pornography 
(number 4) whereas the same picture in Life circa 1996 would not have been 
(number 11) and pictures such as those that appear in Playboy are pornography 
(number 1) but if the same pictures were used in a trial, they would not be according 
to him (number 14).  Part one identifies pornography as a token of a type and part 
two of the definition determines the “ideal” or “primary” context of that token in 
terms of reasonable expectations. 
Rea tells us that: 
The property being pornography isn’t an intrinsic property of 
anything, and it does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of 
anything.  Otherwise, the same item could not count as 
pornography in one context but not another.  In this respect, the 
property being pornography is more like the property, being a 
work of art or being money or being an English word than the 
property being a person.  Whether something has the property 
depends importantly on how it can reasonably be expected to be 
used or treated by some group of rational agents. (2001: 135)   
A photograph that appears in Playboy is pornographic but that very same image 
used in a portfolio by the model is no longer so.  The image is the same but its 
intended use has changed.  Similarly, images of nudity in National Geographic and 
underwear magazines are not pornographic even thought they can be used as such.  
Being a pornographic object is a cultural convention and it must be a made object 
and not a natural one.   
Although it is clear that agents attend to objects differently in different contexts, 
it does not follow that the categories they have are merely pragmatic ones of 
relation. It is possible to disagree with Rea’s intuitions about the court trial (number 
14) because, although the photographs are not being attended to as pornographic 
images, they do remain pornographic images.  Pornographic objects are a susbet of 
other cultural objects in that they excite sexual arousal in their audience.  Other 
aesthetic objects do not or not, at least, primarily.  With pornographic objects this 
needs to be a central expectation.  However, de facto arousal cannot be taken to be 
definitive of pornography.  People like different types of cheese and similarly 
different types of objects arouse different individuals.  A shoe catalogue may be 
sufficient to bring one individual to climax, but it is not pornographic.  Moreover, 
sexual arousal need not be the only aim: Last Tango in Paris (1973) and Baisse-moi 
(2000) also have political aims, but there are very real pornographic elements 
present. 
The problems the “use” and two part form of the definition are supposed to 
overcome are the possibility that the same type can be pornography for one agent 
and not for another without falling into subjectivism where anything can be 
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pornography if one person finds it arousing.  So, part one of Rea's definition 
identifies those objects that one could personally use as pornography, but since such 
objects, as has been shown, can include music videos and shoe catalogues for 
specific individuals, it is insufficient.  Part two, therefore, limits the set identified by 
part one to those objects the community would expect to be used as pornography, 
thus ruling out exceptional, subjective preferences. 
An alternative way to do so, though, is to make the definition culturally relative 
from the start, which is wholly appropriate for such objects.  Such an approach has 
the advantage of making the definition of pornography culturally sensitive and yet, 
by avoiding reference to a particular user, does not fall into subjectivism.   
The issue here has to do with the nature of irreal objects.  Pornography is an irreal 
object, but so are knives, tables, chairs or any thing that is a cultural artefact (broadly 
conceived).  Pornography belongs to a set of objects which are cultural. If there were 
not such things as minds, the object could continue to exist but it would do so quite 
differently. A knife, for example, exists because there are minds which want to cut 
things. If there were no intentions to cut, nor anything that could have aims to cut, 
then the object would not really be a knife but instead a mixture of metal and wood 
in the same way that some rocks are a mix of quartz and granite. Communicative 
material is always cultural because it is an artefact of minds for minds and it requires 
a community of knowers (or attendants) to recognise the object as a certain thing 
that it would not be if that community did not exist.  Music for example exists 
because there are human beings: Beethoven's Ode to Joy remains a piece of music 
even if a farmer plays it very loudly in the field to scare away crows. The category 
music cannot exist independently of a random collection of sounds unless there are 
minds pre-prepared, educated and expectant to receive certain collections of sounds 
as music and others as not.  If pornography is an irreal object, then it exists as it is 
conceived by the community even when temporarily understood in a special way or 
put to another use.1 
The nature of cultural objects can explain the difference between Marilyn 
Monroe in Hustler and Marilyn Monroe in Life and also the difference between 
Playboy read for sexual gratification and Playboy used in a trial.  A cultural artefact is 
an historical object and the community who understands it can be very temporary, 
almost permanent or something in between.  Identical images of Marilyn Monroe 
exist for two different communities in a very brief time; circa thirty years.  The 
images used as evidence in a trial exist for the same community as pornography but 
are being attended to in a special or exceptional way.  So, they remain pornography 
whilst the images of Marilyn Monroe do not.  The quality pornographic exists as long 
as the community can “reasonably” expect agents to attend to the object in that way 
even if a “special point of view” is currently occurring. 
And the phrase “a special point of view” is significant here.  Cultural artefacts are 
objects that would normally be understood one way or another by a given 
community and that understanding determines their nature.  Unique cases will be 
possible but will not be determining of the nature of the communicative content: 
objects used as evidence in trials, Beethoven used to scare crows, music videos 
attended to by hormonally charged teenagers, odd sexual predilections and so on.  
All these remain exceptional uses.  Inversely, Marilyn Monroe’s images cease to be 
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pornographic as attitudes of the community change and these attitudes do 
determine the nature of the object because the way in which one attends to an 
object is not a special point of view but a transformation in the accepted point of 
view. 
The issue with Rea's definition resides in the fact that it is a “use” definition.  The 
“use” definition approach entails that when an object is not being treated as a 
pornographic object, it ceases to be pornography.  On the one hand, the evidence in 
the trial is pornography even if not being used as such and The Story of O is 
pornography even if being read for its representation of women in early twentieth 
century France.  On the other hand, the images of one's spouse kept on one's mobile 
phone are pornographic images even if not (or never) shared with anyone else.  
Something cannot be pornography at one moment and not at the next because the 
way in which it should be understood is determined by the community of attendants 
and not its use in that instant for a particular subject.  Rea’s definition fails to 
acknowledge that cultural artefacts are heterogeneous objects open to 
interpretation but that a standard collection of categories will determine their 
expected use. 
Here, then, is a proposed definition that acknowledges these considerations: 
x is pornography for a specific community C = DF (i) x is 
a token of some sort of communicative material; (ii) x 
exists in the public domain as a possible object of 
exchange, and (iii) it is reasonably expected by C for 
some subjects to attend to x with the exclusive aim of 
being sexually aroused. 
In other words, pornography is that subset of cultural objects which an historically 
and geographically defined community would normally expect to sexually arouse or 
gratify the person who attends to them with the desire to be sexually gratified or 
aroused.  But these attitudes are, contrary to Rea’s definition, not exclusive.  The 
Story of O can arouse sexual desire but also aesthetic appreciation and it remains 
pornography in both of these cases. 
The first thing to notice is that the definition does not use the word pornography 
to define pornography.  The second point is that the definition is for a community 
and does not make reference to an individual subject using that object.  This means 
that there is no need to include the clause “(iii) if S believes that the communicative 
content of x is intended to foster intimacy between S and the subject(s) of x, that 
belief is not among S’s reasons for attending to x’s content;” because the husband 
who watches images of his wife (and vice versa) stands in a special relationship to 
the object in the same way as Burt Lancaster to his film, the art investor to his Van 
Gough and the fourteen year old to his Shakira.  They have a special or exceptional 
relationship to the object which though intelligible to the community is recognised 
as exceptional due to circumstances. Thirdly, the judgement of whether x is to be 
treated as pornography is removed from the individual so that special cases no 
longer pose a problem.  It removes the assumption of an “ideal” audience implied in 
the assertion that it is reasonable to believe that “most of the audience” will use an 
object in a certain way and admits that there are mixed motivations in the 
production of and heterogeneous uses of cultural objects, but that a certain 
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community will still be able to designate it as something: so evidence in a trial is still 
pornography, The Story of O studied by the doctoral student is still pornography and 
Beethoven’s Ode to Joy used to scare crows is still music.   
The new (ii) entails that a difference exists between the performance of private 
sexual acts and the recording (whether it be in a diary, in etchings, in still 
photographs), since once it is known that this record exists, even if it has not been 
read or viewed, it is pornography.  The spouse’s private strip show is akin to private 
sex in that it cannot possibly be an object of exchange.  A public strip show or 
performance in a theatre can.  Once the spouse's strip is filmed and stored on the 
mobile phone then the images are pornographic once at least one person outside 
the couple is aware of their existence.   
The new definition allows a new, more intuitive, division of the standard 
examples of pornographic and non-pornographic objects: 
 
Pornography Non-pornography 
1. Photographic images in Playboy, 
Penthouse, et cetera 
2. Films such as Deep Throat and 
Debbie does Dallas 
3. Peep show performances and 
sexually explicit adult theatre shows 
4. Marilyn Monroe naked in Hustler 
magazine circa 1940 
5. Literature such as Story of O, 
Emmanuelle, a collection of the letters 
from a Penthouse type magazine 
6. “The profit machine” 
7. “Shoe fetishist island” 
8. Intimate images, films made by a 
partner for their partner  
9. Images identical to 1 used as 
evidence in a trial 
9. The Bible 
10. Photographs of naked bodies in 
National Geographic magazine 
11. Artworks such as Michelangelo's 
David and Goya's La Maja Desnuda  
12. Marilyn Monroe naked in Life 
magazine circa 1996 
13. A lingerie catalogue 
14. Images identical to 1 (in left-hand 
column), but appearing in a plastic 
surgeon's portfolio or a medical book. 
15. Intimate performances made by a 
partner for their partner 
Notice the difference between 9 and 14. The images may well be identical but, 
even if individuals may well use 14 for sexual gratification, it would never be 
considered pornography.  On the other hand, 9 is pornography used in a special way. 
There are, of course, a few obvious objections to consider.  The first concerns the 
use of the quantifier “some” in clause iii.  Logically it entails that communicative 
content can be pornography only if more than one subject within the community can 
reasonably be expected to attend to the object in order to be sexually aroused.  The 
range of sexual preferences is very vast and at times particularly idiosyncratic, but 
just because one member of the society can gratify him or herself using the latest 
John Deere tractor catalogue, it does not follow that the catalogue is pornography.  
However, it would be obviously impossible to expect that “all subjects” in a 
community could form the same attitudes to a particular object.  “Some” falls 
between “one” and “all.”  The actual empirical objects that fit the clause would be 
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found out by hermeneutical endeavour by the sociologist who defines the particular 
community in question.  The hermeneutical endeavour may well be as simple as 
asking a section of the community what it believes are pornography, or as difficult as 
interpreting the artistic production of a culture. So, the shoe catalogue is not 
pornography for the UK in 2010, but it is for Rea's fictitious island. The images of 
Marilyn Monroe are pornography in 1960 but not in 1996. 
And that leads on to a further objections: the capacity for a thing to be both 
pornography and not pornography at the same time.  The point is not truly a 
problem if one admits that cultural objects are very often conditional in just this very 
sense.  If one thinks of “Inuit art”, the objects that constitute such a group would not 
normally be art if they were produced in one's own community.  However, “Inuit art” 
like “children's art” identifies a set of objects that one comprehends as “art” for a 
particular community.  Terms such as “art” and “pornography” implicitly possess the 
condition “for us” if never stated and that “us” identifies a relevant community; one 
can sensibly talk about “Victorian pornography”, “Islamic pornography” and so on. 
The conditional nature of the concept entails that judgements may well differ 
within a society which almost inevitably will be made up of distinct communities.  
What may be not pornography for me, could plausibly be so for Islamic or Christian 
communities.  Again, though, this is not truly problematic.  Films in the UK are 
evaluated by the Film Classification Board and given age restrictions.  Such 
evaluations say that the film is appropriate for certain groups.  At present, such 
judgements concern only age but it is not implausible to assume that a multi-cultural 
society may feel necessary to offer advice on which films are inadvisable for which 
religions.  “Pornographic” may well work in this way.  As such, the concept is open 
and flexible.  What may be pornography for a fourteen year old may not be for an 
adult.  What is not pornography for a thirty year old may well be pornography for 
adult over sixty-five years of age. 
But, of course, that opens up the definition to the most problematic objection?  
Who are the “us”?  What is the community?  Communities are geographical and 
historical objects and an agent can belong to more than one.  The problem is to 
identify the borders of such communities: where do they end and new ones begin?  
Such a metaphysics of communities is beyond the scope of this paper, but one can 
talk of Victorian England and England in 2010 as two different communities and the 
Muslims and Chrsitians as two different communities because the values and topics 
of reasoning are different and available to hermeneutical investigation.  Such 
differences is all the definition needs to be plausible. 
Finally, does the definition do any work at all?  It seems that the differentiation of 
objects into pornography and non-pornography is still largely an intuitive one.  Such 
a problem was inherent also in part two of Rea's definition, but consider two 
problematic cases: Medem's Lucia y el sexo and the educational film the Lover’s (sic.) 
Guide (1991).2  A definition ought to be able to allow us to assign the descriptor 
pornographic or not to these objects.  Rea's definition is rather binary: an object is or 
is not pornography.  So, trial evidence is not pornography but the same images, if 
taken home and used, become once more pornography.   
Conversely, for the current definition, the trial evidence is pornography.  Lucia y el 
sexo is pornography.3  It meets the requirements of the definition.  But, like Story of 
THE DEFINITION OF PORNOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
O, just because it is pornography, its aesthetic value is not negated because one can 
still have desires to attend to the object that are not sexual.4  Rea’s definition seems 
to implicitly embody the “bad art” definition of pornography and find it unable to 
admit that pornographic films or novels could possibly be worthwhile aesthetically.  
The educational film is similar.  The object is both pornographic and educational and 
is equally both because both audiences are reasonably expected by our community. 
For Rea's definition, it could not be pornography because there are non-sexual 
desires to attend to it (to be educated).  So, it seems the definition does do some 
work when our intuitions are confused in that it helps to sort out our thinking in 
borderline cases. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Like Rea’s prior definition, the present paper has also sought to offer an 
evaluatively neutral definition of those objects that belong to the set pornography 
and to simultaneously rectify some counter-intuitive consequences of Rea’s 
definition of pornography.  The definition offered is: “x is pornography for a specific 
community C = DF (i) x is a token of some sort of communicative material; (ii) x exists 
in the public domain as a possible object of exchange; and (iii) it is reasonably 
expected by C for some subjects to attend to x with the exclusive aim of being 
sexually aroused.” It might be mentioned that clause iii of this definition makes the 
set of objects that are pornography very broad, including aesthetic objects which 
one might want to exclude.  However, it is important to note that the definition 
makes no normative judgement and those who feel uncomfortable about including 
such objects in the set of pornography are guilty of an assumption that pornography 
is morally wrong.  That assumption has not here been discussed and the definition 
deliberately says nothing that may make one hold such an assumption (or its 
opposite).5 
                                                          
1
 It would be disingenuous of me not to mention that such an idealist position offers much to 
Hegel. 
2
 We shall ignore the grammatical error that seems to suggest that the guide is intended for a 
single would-be Casanova rather than a couple. 
3
 Remember that this is not evaluative.  It is descriptive.  It says nothing about the worth of the 
film. 
4
 Unlike the fourteen year old and music videos since he is exceptional (or a special case). 
5
 I would like to thank the anonymous referees whose constructive comments helped to improve 
the paper. 
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